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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between regime type and decision-makers’
tendency to make sub-optimal choices in international crises. To test hypotheses on
the optimality of democratic foreign policy, I use a novel statistical measure of sub-
optimality in foreign policy behavior. This estimator builds on Signorino’s statistical
strategic models to allow for actor-level variation in deviations from optimal behavior
in a strategic setting. An analysis of the international disputes from 1919 to 1999
shows that democratic leaders have a greater tendency to choose policies not optimal
for their citizens than do non-democratic leaders.
Decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch will generally characterize the proceedings of
one man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in
proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished.
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No.70
Are democratic leaders competent foreign policy-makers? Do democratic politics facil-
itate or hinder optimal foreign policy choices? There is a centuries-old debate in political
science concerning the relationship between regime type and the quality of foreign policy
choices. Part of the literature has argued that democratic foreign policy is more likely to
be sub-optimal, as democratic leaders face diﬃculties in the implementation of foreign pol-
icy due to domestic constraints, while autocratic regimes have fewer diﬃculties because of
the absence or weakness of these constraints (de Tocqueville 1988, Kennan 1950, Gartzke
& Gleditsch 2004). On the opposite end, scholars have argued that domestic constraints
and checks and balances improve the quality of foreign policy because they ensure that the
executive and government bureaucrats are competent and perform their duties appropriately
(Waltz 1967).
For the past two centuries, there was no clear solution to this debate. The two opposing
groups of prominent scholars have talked past each other. A major part of the reason was
that there was no clear and objective way to assess who is right and who is wrong. In
particular, no one has ever oﬀered a systematic way of empirically evaluating the competing
claims of these two views.
In this paper, I oﬀer a solution. I propose a novel statistical measure of sub-optimality
in foreign policy to test, for the ﬁrst time, the competing theories on the optimality of
democratic foreign policy. This statistical estimator builds on Signorino (1999)’s statistical
strategic models to allow for actor-level variation in deviations from optimal behavior. This
statistical tool should have wide application areas in diﬀerent subﬁelds of political science.
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In international relations, the tools provided will help classify - albeit probabilistically - what
is optimal, and what is sub-optimal in diﬀerent foreign policy areas.
My ﬁndings suggest that, compared to their autocratic counterparts, democratic leaders
are more likely to choose policies that are not optimal for their citizens during international
crises. I demonstrate this eﬀect in the context of dyadic international conﬂict situations
during the period after World War I. The reasons for choosing this particular foreign policy
area are that, ﬁrst, militarized disputes are one of the more important and salient foreign
policy areas for which the public might have a strong preference, and in which leaders’
choices might aﬀect their future oﬃce prospects. Second, apart from their potentially large
economic or environmental costs, sub-optimal choices in a military conﬂict might directly or
indirectly result in a large number of unnecessary deaths. Therefore, a better understanding
of the sources of these choices is important. Third, this is one of the most active areas of
substantive research in international relations, and interstate conﬂict data are available for
a larger set of countries and for a longer time period than data on other policy areas.
The next section gives a deﬁnition of sub-optimality in foreign policy, provides an overview
of the literature on the link between regime type and foreign policy optimality, and derives
testable hypotheses. I then present the data and methods utilized to answer the following
questions: what factors aﬀect decision-makers’ tendency to choose sub-optimal policies for
their citizens in crisis situations? Are democratic leaders more likely to make sub-optimal
choices in international politics? The ﬁnal section presents and discusses the results from
the empirical analysis.
What is sub-optimal, and for whom?
Sub-optimality of foreign policy choices, the main topic of this study, remains understudied in
the international relations literature. With respect to government policies, Tuchman (1984)
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deﬁnes folly as the pursuit of policies contrary to the self-interest of the constituency or
the state involved. Similarly, qualifying a choice as sub-optimal presupposes that there is a
better, optimal alternative that should have been chosen. Optimality, however, is a relative
concept. What is optimal for an actor may not be optimal for others. In this paper, I parallel
Tuchman’s deﬁnition to deﬁne sub-optimality with respect to constituencies’ interests in a
given foreign policy issue.
How do we deﬁne an optimal policy for citizens? Ultimately, a policy is an instrument that
policy-makers use to achieve a goal. When we deﬁne optimality from the perspective of the
public, the goal may be to maximize national security, material beneﬁts to the population
from the crisis interaction, to minimize the loss of life, to maintain national prestige –
or a combination of all or a subset of these. For simplicity of exposition, assume that
the goal is to maximize national security only. Because no policy is a perfect instrument,
a given policy might potentially lead to diﬀerent outcomes, which might help or hinder
achieving national security. For instance, US sending troops to Afghanistan was a policy
intended to enhance US security, but the outcome may be as desired as eliminating the
terror threat completely, but also unwanted, such as leading to further terrorist attacks.
Since there is usually some uncertainty about the outcome resulting from a policy, decision-
makers will shape their expectations about a policy by taking into account the costs of its
implementation, the probability of each potential outcome occurring, and the extent to which
each potential outcome serves the policy goal - i.e. enhancing national security. At the end,
the optimal policy for the citizens is the one that maximizes national security based on such
an expectation. In this sense, a policy is sub-optimal for the public, if there is another policy
that is more likely to serve the intended goal of national security.
More formally, I assume that states have objective utility functions to be maximized that
deﬁne their population’s preferences in a crisis. This utility might have diﬀerent components.
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Following the vast empirical literature on international conﬂict that treats states as expected
utility maximizing actors, we can use factors like relative military capabilities, alliance mem-
bership, alliance portfolio similarity, regime type and regime similarity to approximate this
utility shaping constituencies’ preferences in a crisis against an opponent state. An optimal
foreign policy would maximize this utility function. Accordingly, a sub-optimal foreign pol-
icy choice implies that there exist other policy choices that would make the citizenry better
oﬀ.
Selection of foreign policies is made by leaders, and thus it is leaders’ choices that may
result in sub-optimal outcomes for their citizens.1 Why do leaders make choices that are
sub-optimal for their population in international politics? It has been argued in the literature
that having a democratic regime and leaders subject to the control of others might create
diﬃculties in foreign policy decision-making. The age-old debate about the optimality of
democratic foreign policy starts with Alexander Hamilton. In The Federalist Papers, no.
70, Hamilton lists the beneﬁts of having a single, strong executive. He argues that having
such an executive is essential for the protection of the community against foreign attacks. He
also posits that making the executive subject to the control and co-operation of others will
result in a “feeble execution of government”(Hamilton, Madison & Jay 1961). de Tocqueville
(1988) discusses the same issue in his Democracy in America. He contends that democracy’s
good governance qualities are irrelevant in foreign policy, which requires coherence and long
term planning:
Foreign policy does not require the use of any of the good qualities peculiar to
democracy but does demand the cultivation of almost all those which it lacks.
Democracy favors the growth of the state’s internal resources; it extends comfort
and develops public spirit, strengthens respect for law in the various classes
of society, all of which things have no more than an indirect inﬂuence on the
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standing of one nation in respect to another. But a democracy ﬁnds it diﬃcult
to coordinate the details of a great undertaking and to ﬁx on some plan and
carry it through with determination in spite of obstacles. It has little capacity for
combining measures in secret and waiting patiently for the result. Such qualities
are more likely to belong to a single man or to an aristocracy (de Tocqueville 1988,
p.228-229).
More recently, on the other side of the debate, Waltz (1967) argues that democratic
foreign policy has better qualities. He talks about the virtues of having a legislative body
as a restraint upon the executive power in foreign policy. To emphasize the necessity of a
constraint on the executive and bureaucracy in order to test their competence, he gives the
example of an ambassador-designate to Ceylon who did not know the name of the country’s
prime minister. “It is well to have oﬃcials interrogated and their performance surveyed
by a body whose approval and disapproval makes a diﬀerence. The harmful eﬀects of the
process are oﬀset if the diﬃcult and important task of checking and prodding a bureaucracy
of immense size are accomplished”(Waltz 1967, p.108).
Related to this debate, a burgeoning international relations literature focuses on leaders
as the unit of analysis, and studies more systematically the role of domestic politics in
leaders’ foreign policy choices in diﬀerent regimes (Goemans 2000, Goemans 2008, Chiozza
& Goemans 2004, Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson & Morrow 2003). This literature
argues that leaders desire to stay in power and pick policies that maximize their chances
of political survival. Domestic political preferences serve as a restraint on leaders’ policy
choices. As leaders care more about what their population prefers due to oﬃce prospects,
they may choose policies that they would otherwise not choose in the absence of domestic
constraints.
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Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) argue that the size of the winning coalition, the group
of supporters whose support is suﬃcient to keep a given leader in power, has important
implications for the leader’s policy choices. In regimes with smaller winning coalitions,
leaders are more likely to provide private goods to coalition members to stay in power, while
in regimes with larger winning coalitions, it makes more sense for leaders to emphasize public
goods such as national defense to garner popular support. One implication of this is that
winning coalition members in democracies are less loyal, as it is not as costly to be excluded
from the next winning coalition and it is more likely to be included in one after a leadership
change. Because of this, democratic leaders are at greater risk of removal from oﬃce due
to a lost war than are autocratic leaders. As a result, democratic leaders initiate wars only
when they are relatively certain of victory. But when they get into a war, democratic leaders
try harder and expend more resources to win than their autocratic counterparts do.
What does this suggest regarding the sub-optimality for the public of a given choice to
initiate a conﬂict or not? Although Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) do not directly deal
with the optimality of a given foreign policy choice from the population’s point of view, one
implication of their model is that when democracies ﬁght, they ﬁght harder, and they are
more likely to win. Does this suggest that the decision to initiate this conﬂict in the ﬁrst
place was optimal for the public? Since that decision involves reelection concerns that do
not factor into the public’s utility, the answer is less clear. It is not obvious that winning a
war is more optimal than avoiding it in the ﬁrst place due to extra resources and eﬀort spent
by the leaders to win the war, which could rather be used to provide other private or public
goods. On the other hand, if they are not as certain of the victory, democratic leaders can be
very risk-averse, and might avoid wars in order not to risk their seat upon possibly losing the
war, even though these wars might be preferable gambles – ignoring leaders’ oﬃce concerns
– for the population based on an assessment of the expected beneﬁts versus costs. These are
all conjectures, however, as although the theory predicts that democracies will prefer wars
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less frequently than autocracies and obtain better outcomes more frequently when they ﬁght
in a war, it does not produce a clear testable hypothesis on the sub-optimality of the choice
to initiate a conﬂict or not from the voters’ perspective.
The gambling for resurrection literature provides an alternative scenario for the foreign
policy behavior of leaders that face bleak prospects of re-election (Downs & Rocke 1994,
Goemans & Fey 2009). This literature argues that, when a leader has a high probability of
losing oﬃce, she might be willing to gamble for resurrection, and initiate or continue a ﬁght
that her country has a low probability of winning. There is no additional cost to the leader
from losing such a war, as the leader already has a low probability of political survival, but
winning the war promises a better chance of retaining oﬃce. From the leader’s perspective,
this risky gamble is preferable, which might not be optimal for the citizens, since the leader’s
decision involves an external factor – re-election – that is irrelevant for the optimality of the
policy choice for the population. The empirical support for this literature has been mixed
(Goemans 2008). Goemans (2008) argues that the manner of exit matters a lot in leaders’
incentives for gambling for resurrection, and ﬁnds that only leaders that face the risk of
irregular removal from oﬃce should be willing to enter into risky conﬂicts to better their
prospects.
Both the selectorate and the gambling for resurrection theories assume that citizens eval-
uate their leaders based on the outcomes their policies produce, not on the choices they
make. This might be too restrictive of an assumption, especially in a salient issue like inter-
national conﬂict, as citizens might have preferences over the policies and strategies chosen,
rather than the outcomes they produce. Recently, scholars oﬀered another mechanism, the
existence of audience costs, which does not make such an assumption. This burgeoning liter-
ature assumes that leaders suﬀer audience costs if they issue threats in a crisis and then fail
to follow them (Fearon 1994, Smith 1998). In other words, citizens punish bluﬃng leaders
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even their bluﬃng strategies are ex ante likely to produce favorable outcomes in expectation.
The implication of this is that democratic leaders avoid issuing empty threats, and when
they issue a threat, they are more likely to carry it out if their opponents fail to comply.
Using experiments, Tomz (2007) shows that audience costs exist, as citizens seem to dislike
bluﬃng behavior, due to concerns about the country’s reputation and arguably a normative
preference for honesty.
What is the implication of this for the optimality of choices for the public? Although
the existence of audience costs make democratic threats much more credible, and outcomes
more favorable for democracies once their leaders issue a threat, avoiding bluﬃng on the
other hand might produce outcomes that are not optimal for the population. Bluﬃng by
itself can sometimes be considered a valuable strategic tool as a low cost way of achieving a
country’s goals in a crisis. If democratic leaders have to avoid bluﬃng all together in some
cases for oﬃce concerns, even when this is the optimal thing to do in the absence of audience
costs, this suggests that the resulting outcomes might be sub-optimal for the citizenry.
Thus, in terms of empirical testing, all the above arguments tend to anticipate a choice
preference in a particular direction. The selectorate theory anticipates that democracies
are extra careful in getting into wars, especially with other democracies. The gambling
for resurrection arguments, on the other hand, expect more belligerent choices from leaders
when they have small chances of political survival and when they face bleak prospects after
removal from oﬃce. Finally, the audience cost arguments expect that democracies bluﬀ less
often, and when they do issue threats, they are more likely to carry them out. In other words,
all three approaches make predictions about the relative frequencies of diﬀerent strategies
leaders choose in diﬀerent regimes, which can be easily captured by utility estimates in an
empirical model. These theories, however, do not make clear predictions regarding diﬀerences
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in leaders’ likelihood of making sub-optimal choices – as deﬁned in the previous section – in
their decisions to initiate a conﬂict or not.
This paper oﬀers an alternative view, which, besides taking into account these systematic
diﬀerences in the crisis behavior of leaders of diﬀerent regime types, incorporates deviations
from optimal choices. Similar to the above theories, this approach makes the assumption
that leaders ultimately care about staying in oﬃce. As the audience costs arguments, it also
assumes that citizens evaluate their leaders based on policies chosen, rather than outcomes
the policies might produce. One major departure from the above theories is an assumption
about the level of rationality of domestic constituencies. According to this view, in making
policy choices, leaders face, and are responsible to, domestic constituents that may not pos-
sess the same amount of information and cognitive capabilities to assess a foreign policy issue
as the leader, and for this reason they may sometimes have biased beliefs about the optimal
course of action. Furthermore, the constituents may not be aware of their limitations in
calculating the optimal policy position, and they evaluate the performance of their leaders
based on their own preferences, which potentially suﬀer from misperceptions and miscalcu-
lations. Leaders, in return, have to appease public preferences in order to avoid the risk of
removal from oﬃce. For this reason, leaders’ attempt to pick the best policy position might
be constrained by what the public prefers regarding a given foreign policy matter. In other
words, sub-optimal policy choices for the population as a whole may result from a perfectly
rational behavior by leaders trying to stay in oﬃce.
This approach acknowledges that the constituents in a country may deviate from rational
behavior when it comes to assessing policies and evaluating decision-makers’ performances.
The rationality of voters in democracies has been the subject of debate in the literature
(Wittman 1995, Caplan 2007). Against the claims that voters lack the necessary information
to assess policy questions accurately, that they are exposed to biased sources of information,
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and that they can be easily manipulated through biased propaganda, Wittman (1995) argues
that voters are actually quite informed and that the bias in voters’ expectations is exagger-
ated. He states that it is not costly to acquire information, and in large populations, any
available bias should cancel out and optimal policy should result through the median voter’s
preferred position, due to “the law of large numbers”. Caplan (2007) disagrees with Wittman
about this “miracle of aggregation”. He questions voters’ rationality in democracies, and
argues that in democracies voters tend to be systematically biased on policy questions. This
has implications for foreign policy because professional politicians compete for the support
of the public in elections. In many issue areas, he argues, biased beliefs do not cancel each
other out, and the median position among the voters remains biased.2
The bias in voters’ preferences – if it exists – has important implications for foreign policy
decision-making, especially in democracies. The main diﬀerence between democracies and
autocracies in this respect is how much the leaders care about their constituencies’ prefer-
ences. If we assume that, in both autocracies and democracies, rational leaders ultimately
care about staying in power, then democratic leaders must care very much about what the
public prefers. In many democracies, the public can exert its inﬂuence on leaders either
directly through executive elections, or indirectly through elected representatives, like the
Congress in the US. Thus, foreign policy choices in democracies should adhere closely to
the preferences of the public. In autocracies, however, there is not necessarily a one-to-one
correspondence between the public’s preferences and the leaders’ choices in international
politics. Even though autocratic leaders also fear removal from oﬃce, it is more costly to
remove an autocratic leader from oﬃce, and it usually requires violence. For this reason,
small diﬀerences between the public’s expectations and the leaders’ choices in foreign policy
in autocracies may not result in leadership change. In other words, it may not be worth
it for the public to try to forcefully remove an autocratic leader from oﬃce due to small
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or moderate diﬀerences in preferred policy positions. This extra security gives autocratic
leaders more leverage in picking whatever policy they think is optimal for the country.3
The following hypothesis summarizes this approach’s expectation regarding the rela-
tionship between sub-optimal foreign policy behavior tendencies of democratic versus non-
democratic leaders:
Hypothesis 1 (Constrained Optimization). Democratic leaders are more likely to make
sub-optimal foreign policy choices for their population than do autocratic leaders.
Is regime type the only factor that might aﬀect the sub-optimality of foreign policy
choices? Apart from the inﬂuence of domestic politics, there might also be leader level
variations in the likelihood of sub-optimal behavior. Experience is one such factor. The
literature has argued that the experience of a leader can signiﬁcantly aﬀect his or her conﬂict
behavior (Potter 2007, Horowitz, McDermott & Stam 2005). Potter (2007), for instance,
ﬁnds that the probability of a crisis involving the United States declines as the US president
gains time in oﬃce. It may as well be argued that, as a leader serves in oﬃce and becomes
more experienced, the quality of his or her foreign policy behavior, in particular the likelihood
of choosing sub-optimal policies, will change. In particular, a more experienced leader is
expected to be less likely to make sub-optimal choices. Similarly, Horowitz, McDermott &
Stam (2005), and Potter (2007) ﬁnd leader age to be a signiﬁcant factor aﬀecting a state’s
likelihood of crisis involvement. Both studies ﬁnd that older leaders are linked with higher
likelihoods of crisis initiation and escalation. In a similar vein, one can expect that age has
an impact on a leader’s cognitive capabilities. As a leader grows older, he or she may be
more prone to making sub-optimal foreign policy choices. The availability of leader-level
data enables us to evaluate these expectations and control for them in the data analysis
section.
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Data Analysis
To test the hypothesis derived in the previous section, this study focuses on militarized
interstate disputes after World War I and investigates if regime type has an eﬀect on leaders’
likelihood of making sub-optimal choices in crisis situations. The data set used combines
the Correlates of War Project’s (COW) dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes data set,4 and
Goemans, Gleditsch & Chiozza (2006)’s Archigos data set.
The main actors of the theories discussed in the previous section are national leaders in
interstate crises, making policy decisions for their population; the unit of empirical analysis
is therefore leader-dyad-years. Chiozza & Goemans (2004) warn political scientists of the
mismatch between theoretical and empirical units of analysis. They stress that if the theory
prescribes leaders as the main actors, using country as the unit in the empirical analysis may
result in misleading inferences. A second advantage of using leaders as the unit in this study
is that this choice makes possible controlling for leader-level factors such as age or experience
that have been previously found to aﬀect leaders’ crisis behavior. The main diﬀerence from
a country-dyad-year is that, if a country had two or more leaders in a given year, they are
counted as separate observations and are potentially assigned diﬀerent regressor values.5
The simple game in Figure 1(A) forms the basis for the coding of the dependent variable
in the empirical analysis. The dependent variable is the outcome of a dyadic crisis situation
between the leaders of two countries. There are three possible values of the outcome variable:
Status Quo, showing an absence of militarized conﬂict between the two countries; Capitu-
lation, meaning the target country does not respond militarily to an attack by the initiator
country during a crisis; and War, indicating there is militarized conﬂict between the two
countries. The coding of the dependent variable incorporates strategic interaction, which is
an important feature of interstate crises. In the model, initiating leaders have to take into
account their targets’ expected response before deciding to attack or not. The three values
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of the dependent variable are coded based on the involved actors’ recorded hostility levels
for each directed dyadic crisis in the data set.6
The explanatory variables are measured at the leader and the country level, representing
a set of domestic and international factors expected to aﬀect crisis behavior and proneness
to sub-optimal choices. Consistent with the hypothesis speciﬁed in the previous section, the
main theoretical variable used in this analysis is the regime type of the countries involved.
For robustness, both a binary regime type variable marking democracies and the categorical
Polity score are used. The Polity score ranges from -10 to 10, -10 representing the most
autocratic and 10 representing the most democratic countries (Marshall & Jaggers 2007). At
the country level, variables used to estimate preferences include relative military capabilities,
major power status, alliance behavior and interest similarity, and revisionism, all of which
have been theorized in the literature to aﬀect states’ crisis and conﬂict behavior. At the
leader level, other included variables measure leaders’ experience and other personal traits,
which are expected to inﬂuence foreign policy behavior. The on-line appendix provides a
full description of all the variables used in the analysis.
Statistical Estimation
In order to test the hypothesis from the previous section, we need a statistical technique
that, ﬁrst, operationalizes sub-optimal behavior, and second, enables linking independent
variables, such as regime type, to the probability of making sub-optimal choices. Also,
the dependent variable of the analysis represents the outcome of the strategic interaction
depicted in Figure 1(A), as the initiators in the model choose their strategies based on the
expected response from their target. Signorino & Yilmaz (2003) show that, when data to be
analyzed involves such strategic interaction, the failure to incorporate this into the empirical
model is a major source of bias. Signorino (1999) develops a structural estimation technique
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for empirical analysis of data on strategic interaction.7 The heteroskedastic strategic probit
(HSP) estimator used in this paper builds upon Signorino’s strategic probit (SP) estimator
to capture sub-optimal behavior tendencies of actors in a strategic interaction.8
SP is an appropriate technique for analyzing factors that inﬂuence actors’ choices in
simple strategic interactions with discrete choices. The SP model assigns regressors to actors’
outcome utilities to estimate the utilities. In other words, in a model like the one in Figure
1(A), SP can estimate, for instance, a country’s war expected utility, by looking at covariates
such as the country’s regime type, or its military capability. In a SP model, actors pick
actions that give them the highest expected utility calculated based on the outcome utilities
and on the expected behavior of their opponents down the game tree. In addition, the agent
error version of SP allows for the possibility that actors may miscalculate their expected
utilities associated with each action. According to this speciﬁcation, on average, actors use
the true expected utility, but in any given instance may overestimate or underestimate it
and behave accordingly. These deviations from the true expected utility, represented by αij
in Figure 1(B), are usually assumed to follow a normal distribution. SP models are based
on one major assumption, that the variance of the agent error distribution is the same for
each actor in each observation in the data set. In other words, according to the SP model
with the agent error speciﬁcation, all actors in all observations in the sample have the same
likelihood of deviating from their true expected utility.
The HSP estimator I propose retains all but one of these characteristics of the SP model,
while taking this technique a step further. In particular, HSP modiﬁes the agent error
speciﬁcation of SP to incorporate sub-optimal choices by leaders in a conﬂict situation. I relax
SP’s assumption of homoskedasticity – common constant variance, or the equal likelihood
of deviations from optimality – and allow sub-optimal behavior tendencies, measured by the
variances of the αij parameters, to vary across diﬀerent leaders depending on factors like
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domestic regime type or leader speciﬁc characteristics.9 With HSP, it is possible that one
actor in a crisis is more likely to deviate from optimal behavior than another in the same or
a diﬀerent crisis. As in the case of SP, I assume that on average each player still picks the
optimal policy (i.e. the mean of the normally distributed random deviations is still zero),
but of interest is deviations from this average, in particular the variance of the deviations.
If a factor increases the variance of these random deviations, this indicates that the player
is more likely to deviate from the true expected utility, and choose a sub-optimal action at
the end.
How are heteroskedastic agent error variance and sub-optimal foreign policy choices re-
lated? Suppose, for instance, that a leader compares Attack and Not Attack decisions, and
assume that the Attack decision is the optimal choice for the population to pick in that
interaction. HSP allows each leader to deviate from the true utility for the public (due to
electoral concerns) in assigning expected utilities to each of these choices. The heteroskedas-
tic error variance is the variance of these deviations from the true expected utility. As these
deviations get larger, it becomes more likely that the leader will make a sub-optimal policy
choice for the population. In particular, if the leader assigns a larger expected utility value
to the Not Attack choice than the true utility of this action for the population, for instance,
then the leader might choose to Not Attack even though the optimal choice is to Attack.
These deviations from optimality are assumed to be random, representing the volatility of
public opinion across diﬀerent policy issues. In the homoskedastic model, the deviations
are assumed to follow the same distribution for each decision, with zero mean and constant
variance. In the heteroskedastic variant, on the other hand, each actor is allowed to have a
diﬀerent error variance. Thus, as the variance increases, it becomes more likely to experience
large deviations from the correct expected utility, and hence it is increasingly more likely
that a sub-optimal policy choice will be made. The important word to emphasize here is
the likelihood. The larger the variance, the more likely the leader is to choose a sub-optimal
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option for the population, because a larger deviation is more likely to switch the preference
ranking between Attack and Not Attack. What the estimator does, in the end, is to model
this variance with regressors to ﬁnd out which factors make the variance larger and hence
sub-optimal choices more likely.10
Results
The main hypothesis derived in the theory section concerns the relationship between a coun-
try’s regime type and its decision-makers’ likelihood of making sub-optimal choices in inter-
national crises. Table 1 reports the results on the factors associated with the initiator’s and
target’s sub-optimal choice tendencies in a crisis. In addition, the statistical model produces
estimates of the factors associated with the actors’ utilities from the Status Quo, War, and
Capitulation outcomes of the model. Tables 2 and 3 report these outcome utility estimates
for the initiator and the target leader. Outcome utilities determine what is optimal for
an actor to choose in a crisis situation, while variations in sub-optimal behavior tendency
suggest how likely the actor is to deviate from an optimal solution in a given crisis. In
other words, auxiliary results presented in Tables 2 and 3 indicate what factors make various
outcomes more or less attractive to leaders in a crisis, while Table 1 focuses on the main
argument of this paper and shows what factors make a leader more likely to deviate from a
more attractive to a less attractive choice.
For both the initiator and the target, ﬁve diﬀerent models are reported in Table 1. They
employ alternative speciﬁcations for proneness to sub-optimal choices, and include diﬀerent
operationalizations of regime type. Model 1 includes the Polity score of the countries involved
(Democracy); the changes in the Polity score from the previous year (Democracy); a
dummy variable marking major powers (Major Power); and leader’s age (Age) and tenure
(log(Tenure)) to control for experience as a potential factor aﬀecting the likelihood of sub-
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optimal choices. Model 2 replaces Democracy with a binary variable that takes the value of
1 when Democracy is greater than or equal to 6. Model 3 is a reduced form version that
only includes state level variables, excluding the leader-level variables log(Tenure) and Age.
Models 4 and 5 include Democracy2 as a regressor in two diﬀerent speciﬁcations to test if
there are nonlinearities in the eﬀect of democracy on the likelihood of making sub-optimal
choices in international crises.
As can be seen from Tables 2 and 3, Models 1 through 5 also utilize diﬀerent regres-
sors to estimate outcome utilities. The ﬁve speciﬁcations include in the utilities a subset of
Relative Cap., Revisionist, Both Democ., Democracy, Democracy, Defense Pact, S Score,
log(Distance), Election, and Prev.times.11 All these variables, representing systemic, state
and leader level factors, are theoretically motivated and are widely used control variables
in empirical studies of international conﬂict. First, Relative Cap., relative military capa-
bilities between the two states, has been employed in many empirical models of interna-
tional conﬂict, due to the important role it plays in realist and rational choice theories
(Powell 1999, Rousseau, Gelpi, Reiter & Huth 1996, Bennett & Stam 1996, Bennett &
Stam 2000a). By including this variable in both players’ War utilities, I test the hypoth-
esis that, as a state gets relatively stronger against its opponent, it will be more likely to
use force in a dispute. Realist theoretical approaches to international conﬂict also argue
that shared security interests play an important role in states’ crisis behavior. Joint al-
liance membership is a variable that has been widely used in modeling international conﬂict
(Bueno de Mesquita 1981, Bremer 1992). A defense pact is the strongest type of alliance
commitment coded in the Correlates of War data. Defense Pact is included in the Status
Quo utility of the initiator to test if this type of alliance commitment reduces the likeli-
hood of conﬂict initiation between two states. Similarly, alliance portfolio similarity plays
an important role in the expected utility theory of war in predicting international conﬂict
(Bueno de Mesquita 1981, Bennett & Stam 2000a, Bennett & Rupert 2003). Signorino &
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Ritter (1999) oﬀer S Score as a theoretically superior approach to measuring the similarity
of two countries’ alliance commitments (Signorino & Ritter 1999). Accordingly, I include S
Score in the initiator’s Status Quo utility to control for the potentially pacifying eﬀect in a
dispute of the similarity of alliance portfolios between the two states. Revisionist is a proxy
for a given state’s satisfaction with the status quo in a given crisis. It is included in the two
states’ War utilities to control for states that have a stronger preference for using violence
to change the status quo in a given interaction (Rousseau et al. 1996). Regime type is ar-
gued to be an important determinant of conﬂict behavior (Fearon 1994, Bueno de Mesquita,
Morrow, Siverson & Smith 1999, Schultz 1999). Both Democ., an indicator variable that
marks if both states in the dyad are democratic, is included in the Initiator’s Status Quo
utility to test the argument that two democracies are less likely to ﬁght with each other, as
proposed by the democratic peace theory. If this argument holds, Both Democ. should make
Status Quo more attractive to the initiating leader. I also included Democracy variable to
both states’ War payoﬀs to control for any unilateral eﬀect of regime type on states’ conﬂict
behavior (Huth & Allee 2002). Similarly, the Democracy variable controls for a poten-
tially diﬀerent conﬂict propensity of democratizing states (Mansﬁeld & Snyder 1995, Ward
& Gleditsch 1998, Mansﬁeld & Snyder 2002, Narang & Nelson 2009). log(Distance), the
physical distance between states, is included in the Initiator’s Status Quo utility to control
for the eﬀect of geographical proximity on the likelihood of conﬂict initiation. It has been
argued that geographical proximity makes conﬂicts of interest more likely between states,
and military conﬂicts more feasible if such conﬂicts of interest exist (Bremer 1992). Finally,
at the leader level, two variables are included in both players’ War utilities: the Election vari-
able aims to control for diversionary incentives of leaders in initiating conﬂict during election
years to take advantage of a potential “rally around the ﬂag” eﬀect (Levy 1989, Chiozza &
Goemans 2003). Prev. times, or the number of times a leader has previously been in oﬃce,
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is another proxy for leaders’ experience, which has been argued to aﬀect the likelihood of
conﬂict involvement (Potter 2007, Horowitz, McDermott & Stam 2005).
Are Democratic Leaders More Prone to Making Sub-optimal Choices?
Regarding the eﬀect of Democracy on the likelihood of sub-optimal choice in international
crises, the constrained optimization approach reﬂected in Hypothesis 1 anticipates a sig-
niﬁcant positive coeﬃcient, as it is argued that democratic foreign policy is more likely to
represent public’s potentially sub-optimal preferences. The empirical results show robust
support for this hypothesis. Table 1 reports the results on the magnitude of variations in
sub-optimal choices in international crises. A positive coeﬃcient on a variable means that,
other things being equal, the variable increases the likelihood of deviations from optimal
behavior for that actor. In contrast, a negative coeﬃcient indicates that, when that covari-
ate increases, sub-optimal behavior will be less likely. In all ﬁve speciﬁcations presented,
democracy is a factor that signiﬁcantly increases the likelihood of deviations from optimal
behavior. This is true for the leaders of both democratic initiators and democratic targets.12
As the table shows, these results are robust to alternative speciﬁcations for deviations from
optimality and for outcome utilities, and the eﬀect remains signiﬁcant when diﬀerent oper-
ationalizations of democracy are used.13
Democratization is also argued to be an important factor in foreign policy behavior
(Mansﬁeld & Snyder 1995, Ward & Gleditsch 1998). Even though there is a renewed interest
in this topic and a recent empirical disagreement on the eﬀect of democratization on conﬂict
(Narang & Nelson 2009), the existing literature does not discuss the eﬀect of democratization
on the sub-optimality of foreign policy choices. The statistical analysis that is presented here
suggests that democratization has an important inﬂuence on the likelihood of sub-optimal
choices in international politics. In Models 1, 2, and 5, for the initiator, Democracy has a
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positive signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, indicating that a faster pace of democratization increases the
levels of sub-optimal behavior in international crises. For the target leader, Democracy
does not have a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. For a democratic leader who considers initiating an
international crisis, then, improvements in the country’s democratic governance over the past
year increase the likelihood of a sub-optimal decision. This eﬀect operates through both an
increased democracy score and the democratization variable in the model.
What is the size of democracy’s eﬀect on the likelihood of sub-optimal behavior? For
an intuitive interpretation of the estimation results, I calculate the percentage increase in
the variance parameter in response to a change in the Democracy variable. For instance,
results from Model 1 for the conﬂict initiator show that changing Democracy from -10 to 10,
the whole range of the variable, increases the variance parameter measuring the likelihood
and potential magnitude of deviations from optimality by 32%. There is a similar pattern
in the other four speciﬁcations: on average, democracies have 20% to 43% larger variance
parameters compared to autocracies in all ﬁve models reported. This estimate does not
take into account the change in Democracy variable. If we assume that this hypothetical
transition from a complete autocracy to a complete democracy takes place in one year, we
also need to take into account the change in the Democracy variable in calculating the
change in the variance parameter. When we do that, the substantive eﬀect of democracy
on the likelihood of sub-optimal choices is larger in magnitude: this newly democratized
country will on average experience a 105% to 207% increase in its tendency to deviate from
optimality according to the ﬁve models reported. This implies that the error variance more
than doubles in response to complete democratization in a single year. The eﬀect is still
sizeable for less extreme changes in the polity score. For instance, a 5-point democratization
in a given year (a two standard deviations change in the sample) increases the sub-optimality
probability by about 20%. For the target leader, the eﬀect is even more pronounced: in any
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of the ﬁve models estimated for the target leader, increasing the Democracy variable’s value
from -10 to 10 more than doubles the player’s error variance.
Even though democracy has a signiﬁcant eﬀect in the same direction on both the initiating
and target leaders’ sub-optimal choice tendencies, signiﬁcant diﬀerences remain between
the two types of leaders. First, although democratization signiﬁcantly increases initiating
leaders’ likelihood of making sub-optimal choices, the eﬀect is not distinguishable from zero
for target leaders. Perhaps most strikingly, the major power status of a country has opposite
signiﬁcant eﬀects on its leader’s tendency to pick sub-optimal policies in conﬂict initiation
and resistance decisions. The results suggest that leaders of major power initiators are more
likely to make sub-optimal choices in an international crisis. This is not true when the major
power leader is a target, however. When a major power country is attacked, its leader is
signiﬁcantly less likely to make a sub-optimal choice compared to the leaders of less powerful
countries. In any of the ﬁve speciﬁcations considered, when leaders of major power countries
initiate a crisis, their estimated variance is on average 23-25% larger than that of less powerful
countries. On the other hand, when they are targeted, major power leaders are signiﬁcantly
less likely to deviate from optimal behavior, represented by an estimated variance parameter
that is on average 41% to 56% smaller than that of the leaders of less powerful countries.
This is a very interesting ﬁnding, yet the theories discussed in the previous section do not
guide us on this diﬀerence in behavior between the leaders of initiating versus target major
powers. Why do major power leaders are less likely to make sub-optimal choices when they
are attacked? One potential theoretical explanation is that Major Power serves as a proxy
for the diversity of a state’s interests. It is possible that major powers like the US have
more diverse strategic interests in diﬀerent parts of the world, and this might be partially
responsible for the larger estimated error variance for the initiators. For the targets, on the
other hand, in many speciﬁcations, Major Power has a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient in the opposite
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direction, perhaps because the decisions to resist or not are only conditional on an initial
attack, which reduces the diversity of the target’s interests for that crisis.
To further test the potential link between the diversity of interests and the size of the es-
timated agent error variances, we can look at strategic rivalries between states. It is possible
that for states who are in a rivalry, much of the foreign policy is focused on the opponent,
which reduces the diversity of the state’s interests. This might in turn result in a smaller
estimated error variance. To control for this possibility, I re-estimated the ﬁve models dis-
cussed above, with Strategic Rivalry added to the variance and Initiator’s War utilities.14
Surprisingly, this variable in the variance speciﬁcation has a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃ-
cient for initiators, and an insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient for targets. The implication is that, if the
dyad is in a strategic rivalry, initiator leaders are more likely to deviate from optimal choices,
while this eﬀect in the same direction is insigniﬁcant for target leaders. On the other hand,
the coeﬃcient of Strategic Rivalry in Initiator’s War utility is positive, and signiﬁcant in
two speciﬁcations, which suggests that a leader is more likely to initiate a militarized crisis
against a state if the two states are in a rivalry. The results establish the robustness of the
original ﬁndings on the relationship between regime type and the error variance. None of
the substantive results on the error variance changes when we add this variable to the speci-
ﬁcation, except Age becoming insigniﬁcant in Initiator’s utility. In particular, the statistical
and substantive eﬀect of Democracy stays the same in all ﬁve speciﬁcations reported.
To summarize, with the help of data, I have shown that regime type, major power
status, age and experience have an eﬀect on leaders’ tendency to make sub-optimal choices
in international crises. Can these results indicate whether a given conﬂict initiation or the
decision to resist an attack was a sub-optimal choice for a country? In addition to capturing
leaders’ proneness to making sub-optimal choices, the statistical estimation results enable us
to make probabilistic statements about whether a particular outcome, or a choice by an actor,
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was sub-optimal or not. The model can estimate the expected utility diﬀerence between the
actions available to each player, and also the variance of the deviations from optimality.
Using these two estimates, one can calculate the probability of getting a deviation from
optimal behavior that is large enough to switch the sign of the expected utility diﬀerence
and change the estimated preferred action for a player.15 Figure 2 shows the distribution of
these probabilities for all the leaders in the sample. As the left plot in Figure 2 demonstrates,
most of the decisions about conﬂict initiation are unlikely to involve sub-optimal choices,
as the probability of getting a large enough deviation to switch the initiator’s preferences is
close to zero for most of the cases. The average probability that an observation involves a
sub-optimal choice by the initiator is around .06 in all ﬁve speciﬁcations reported. Still, some
of the observations are highly likely to involve a sub-optimal choice as the large standard
deviation of the estimated probabilities indicates. More strikingly, the targets’ decision to
resist against an attack or not is more likely to involve a sub-optimal choice. The plot on
the right in Figure 2 shows the distribution of the sub-optimality probabilities for the target
countries in the sample. Given that a country faces a military attack, its leader on average
has about a .36 probability of making a sub-optimal choice in her response.
As a measure of the model’s predictive performance, I calculate the model’s outcome
prediction for each observation in the sample. All the ﬁve model speciﬁcations presented
in Tables 1-3 have a very good predictive capacity. These speciﬁcations correctly predict
on average about 84% of the outcomes in the sample, beating the modal category of 77%.
In addition, likelihood ratio tests suggest that each of the ﬁve HSP models ﬁts signiﬁcantly
better than the homoskedastic variants, with comparison p-values well below .0001.16 This
suggests that modeling heteroskedasticity in this context is not only substantively interesting,
but is statistically necessary as well.17 To further illustrate the model’s predictive capability,
I discuss one example case from the sample, the Iran Hostage Crisis of 1980.18
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Iran Hostage Crisis. Perhaps one of the ﬁrst cases that come to mind in recent history
when talking about sub-optimal policy choices in international crises is the failed rescue
operation during the Iran Hostage Crisis.19 The Hostage Crisis started when, during the
Iranian revolution, Iranian students took control of the US Embassy in Tehran and took 66
Americans hostage in November 1979. The US president Jimmy Carter’s early reaction to
the situation was to use diplomatic means exclusively and avoid the use of military force.
However, after the crisis lingered for months and the US oﬃcials could not successfully
negotiate a release of the hostages, President Carter ordered a very risky military rescue
operation in April 1980, code-named Operation Eagle Claw, which failed to achieve the
release of the hostages and resulted in the death of 8 Americans. The crisis ended and the
hostages were ﬁnally released after 444 days, months after the failed operation, in January
1981. My model predicts that Carter’s decision to launch this risky military operation had
a sub-optimal choice probability of .37, one of the larger probabilities in the sample.
The rescue mission was the greatest disaster of Carter’s presidency (Houghton 2001). It
was deemed by many authorities, including people from the Carter administration, to have
a low probability of success, with almost guaranteed loss of life. Scholars proposed a variety
of theories explaining the choice and the timing of this policy.20 The theory proposed in
this paper oﬀers another alternative story that complements the existing ones and adds to
our understanding of the rescue mission by positing that sub-optimal public preferences for
a tougher policy and the public pressure on President Carter might have played a role in
Carter’s choice. As each day passed without the release of the hostages, the public pressure
increased on Carter to bring the crisis to an end and the hostages back home. Media also
played a signiﬁcant role in building the immense pressure on Carter. Walter Croncite of
CBS would close his report every night during the crisis by reporting the number of days
the Americans had been held by Iranians (Houghton 2001). McDermott (1998) and Gartner
(1993) provide a very clear account of the public sentiments towards President Carter and the
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US foreign policy during those days. It appears that, although at the crisis onset President
Carter enjoyed a rally-around-the-ﬂag boost in his popular support, as the crisis dragged,
his approval ratings steadily dropped, and they plummeted right before the rescue mission.
More and more citizens thought that Carter’s peaceful foreign policy choices in dealing with
the crisis were a failure. An ABC-Harris poll showed that right before the operation, only
12% of the population supported Carter’s peaceful means to deal with the hostage crisis
(Farber 2005, McDermott 1998). Facing the decline in his popular support and the demands
for tougher policies, together with the pressure of an upcoming election against a challenger
Reagan who steadily increased his support base as the crisis dragged, Carter had to choose
to launch the risky rescue operation.
The Secretary of State of the time, Cyrus Vance, thought that negotiations should have
been given more time, and it was better to wait for the Iranian political environment to
settle than to launch a military rescue operation that was highly likely to fail. In McDermott
(1998)’s words, “Ex post facto, an analyst can see that the best option had been oﬀered by
Secretary Vance. The hostages were released essentially unharmed by the Iranians when they
no longer served any function. Once the revolutionary government was secure, the hostages
were allowed to leave,. . . . In some sense, Carter received the right advice – to do nothing –
from Vance; he chose to ignore it, however, and take the more risky military option.”
Conclusion
An old debate in political science questions the relationship between regime type and the
quality of foreign policy. While some argued that democratic foreign policy is more likely to
be sub-optimal, as democratic leaders face diﬃculties in the implementation of foreign policy
due to domestic constraints, others argued that democratic politics facilitates a healthy for-
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eign policy. Surprisingly, there had not been any empirical study in the literature comparing
these opposing claims. Part of the reason was that there was no clear way of operationalizing
and objectively measuring sub-optimality in foreign policy.
This study ﬁlls the gap in the literature by providing an analysis of the link between a
country’s regime type and its leader’s tendency to choose sub-optimal policies in international
crises. The statistical tools I developed and used in this paper help estimate decision-makers’
tendency to deviate from optimal policies for their countries during international crises.
Statistical analysis of international disputes during the period after World War I shows that
democratic leaders are more prone to making foreign policy choices that are sub-optimal for
their country than do autocratic leaders. This result is robust to diﬀerent operationalizations
of democracy and democratization. The ﬁndings in this paper may not put an end to this
old debate on the link between regime type and foreign policy optimality, but hopefully they
will facilitate a healthier discussion where opposing claims can be tested and rejected.
26
Notes
1Note that this deﬁnition does not rule out the possibility that choices that are sub-optimal for the state
might be perfectly optimal for the leaders. In fact, one of the mechanisms discussed in the next section
incorporates this possibility.
2His empirical examples include the tendency among the public to underestimate the beneﬁts of free
market mechanism and the beneﬁts of interactions with foreigners.
3One might argue that leaders often have the ability to control and shape the public opinion. As long
as there exists some degree of independence of the public opinion from leader preferences, the implications
of this theory will hold. Secondly, as long as leaders have a better estimate of the optimal policy than the
public does, and they can monitor the public’s preferences accurately enough, the assumption of perfectly
rational leaders is not crucial.
4The MIDs data set is generated using the EUGene software. For more information, see Ghosn & Bennett
(2003) and Bennett & Stam (2000b).
5Dyads between all contemporaneous leaders from 1919 to 1999 – whether they are involved in a conﬂict
or not – create a very large data matrix. More than 99% of these observations are peaceful dyads. Analyzing
such a big sample is not only cumbersome and computationally costly; it is also unnecessary. As King &
Zeng (2001b) show, most of the information in such unbalanced samples is in the rare observations rather
than abundant non-events. For these reasons, the analyses in this section are conducted in a smaller sample
generated through choice-based sampling. This method endogenously samples based on the values of the
dependent variable by retaining all conﬂict observations and using only a random sub-sample of peace dyads.
The merits of this sampling method in international relations empirical research, where many interesting
dependent variables are rare events, are discussed in detail in the literature (King & Zeng 2001a).
6There are six hostility levels in the data set: 0=No hostility, 1=No militarized action, 2=Threat to use
force, 3=Display of force, 4=Use of Force, 5=War. A country is coded to use force (attack for the initiator,
resist for the target) if it reached a hostility level of 4 or higher in that crisis. MIDs data set’s dispute
originator indicator is used to code the sequentiality of the dependent variable. For non-dispute cases, both
directed dyads are included in the data set and choice-based sampling procedure described above randomly
selected among the two to possibly include one into the sample. The substantive results about the link
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between regime type and the levels of uncertainty are the same if the analyses are conducted on a restricted
sample of disputes (above hostility level 1). These additional results are likely to suﬀer from selection bias,
but they are available from the author upon request.
7For a simpler alternative to this estimator, see Bas, Signorino & Walker (2008).
8HSP estimator is discussed in detail in Bas (2011). A description appears in the online appendix to this
paper.
9This approach of linking actors’ sub-optimal choice tendencies to regressors is similar to heteroskedastic
probit models where error variance is modeled with regressors. Examples in the conﬂict literature include
Clark & Nordstrom (2005) and Clark, Nordstrom & Reed (2008).
10Thus, a larger variance does not necessarily indicate sub-optimality in a speciﬁc crisis. It is possible
that a leader with a larger estimated variance in a given crisis chooses the optimal policy, while a leader
with a smaller variance in another crisis chooses a sub-optimal policy, because deviations from optimality are
random. The diﬀerence is that, on average, the leader who experiences a larger variance will be more likely
to make sub-optimal choices compared to the other leader, because a large enough deviation from optimality
is more probable from a distribution with a larger variance than one with a smaller variance.
11The variable descriptions are presented in the Appendix.
12These results by no means suggest that democratic leaders are more belligerent in international crises.
As the auxiliary results presented in Tables 2 and 3 show, both Democracy and Democracy negatively
aﬀect a leader’s utility from initiating a conﬂict. This means that democratic leaders are less likely to initiate
crises in general, and they prefer not to get into a conﬂict with a fellow democracy in particular. This is
in line with the vast literature on the democratic peace. One caveat to this ﬁnding is that, when they
are attacked, democracies are more likely to resist. The negative coeﬃcient of Democracy also contrasts
Mansﬁeld and Snyder’s (1995)’s ﬁndings, which are recently challenged by Narang & Nelson (2009).
13Although not reported here, results are also robust to a variety of other checks, including: using Executive
Constraints index from the Polity data set instead of the Polity score; lagging the regime type variables;
controlling for states that have a Polity score that lies between -5 and 5; restricting the analysis to diﬀerent
time periods in the data set, such as excluding World War II years, or only looking at the Cold War years;
including a variable in the variance speciﬁcations measuring each leader’s manner of entry to oﬃce; and using
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diﬀerent operationalizations for alliance, experience, and military capabilities variables used in the analysis.
These results are available upon request.
14These results are reported in the online appendix.
15In the extreme case, the probability of getting a shock that would make the player choose another action
would be .5, because that is the highest possible probability of getting a positive (negative) draw from a
normal distribution with mean zero when the estimated utility diﬀerence is negative (positive).
16Results are presented in the online appendix.
17In a working paper, Keele & Park (2006) argue that, due to potential fragility of the heteroskedastic
probit model, scholars should at a minimum use diﬀerent starting values. I re-estimated the reported models
in the manuscript with 100 diﬀerent random starting values and I reached the same estimates. Keele & Park
(2006) also suggest plotting the proﬁle likelihood function for various coeﬃcient values to check for any ﬂat
regions, which might indicate poor convergence. My examination of the proﬁle likelihood graphs indicates
that the coeﬃcient estimates are stable and converged successfully.
18The on-line appendix contains a table with several more example crises from the data set with the
involved leaders’ estimated probabilities of sub-optimal choices. These examples include conﬂicts between
an old colonial power and its ex-colony over the control of a strategic territory, which was ultimately resolved
in favor of the ex-colony after military conﬂict and international pressure (Bizerte Crisis, Suez Canal Crisis,
Ifni War); a costly, unnecessary or unsuccessful rescue attempt in response to a hostage crisis (Mayaguez
Incident and the Iran Hostage Crisis); and conﬂicting sovereignty claims of two neighboring countries over
an insigniﬁcant piece of territory, which escalated into costly violence and required major power intervention
(Imia-Kardak). In most of these cases, there is a scholarly consensus that one or more of the involved parties’
choices were sub-optimal, which seems to be conﬁrmed by the sub-optimality probability estimates of the
model.
19For a detailed account of the hostage crisis and the Iran-US relations during the period, see Sick (1986).
20See Houghton (2001) for a summary of the alternative explanations.
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Status Quo
Defense pact .154
(.258)
.262
(.321)
-.006
(.219)
.303
(.291)
.155
(.259)
S Score .032
(.097)
-.036
(.096)
.031
(.118)
.010
(.090)
.021
(.098)
log(Distance) .040
(.027)
.014
(.024)
.022
(.027)
.054*
(.025)
.040
(.028)
Both Democ. .564*
(.163)
.645*
(.167)
.603*
(.209)
.512*
(.145)
.581*
(.160)
Capitulation
Constant -9.93*
(.666)
-11.52*
(.715)
-10.54*
(.68)
-9.72*
(.735)
-9.99*
(.659)
War
Election .057
(.145)
.075
(.138)
-.066
(.161)
.106
(.131)
.059
(.147)
Democracy -.116*
(.034)
-.080*
(.035)
-.128*
(.040)
-.115*
(.035)
Democracy -.289*
(.047)
Democ. Dummy -2.20*
(.906)
Prev. times .18*
(.043)
.138*
(.045)
.140*
(.041)
.181*
(.044)
Revisionist 8.63*
(.702)
9.19*
(.502)
10.03*
(.537)
8.23*
(.444)
8.66*
(.721)
Relative Cap. 2.29*
(.531)
2.54*
(.496)
2.16*
(.601)
2.22*
(.468)
2.28*
(.552)
N 16149 16640 16287 16640 16149
Log-likelihood -263.67 -275.21 -259.72 -275.08 -263.65
Table 2: Initiator’s Outcome Utilities
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
War
Democracy .007*
(.002)
.005*
(.002)
.009*
(.003)
.007*
(.003)
Democracy -.001
(.004)
Democ. Dummy .258*
(.079)
Election .042*
(.020)
.054*
(.020)
.046*
(.013)
.059*
(.029)
.042*
(.020)
Prev. times .039*
(.015)
.040*
(.013)
.040*
(.017)
.039*
(.015)
Relative Cap. .387*
(.169)
.485*
(.151)
.318*
(.097)
.430*
(.186)
.381*
(.171)
Revisionist 1.43*
(.314)
1.55*
(.252)
1.60*
(.167)
1.42*
(.289)
1.42*
(.318)
Constant .028
(.069)
.083
(.085)
-.007
(.065)
.073
(.075)
.031
(.080)
N 16149 16640 16287 16640 16149
Log-likelihood -263.67 -275.21 -259.72 -275.08 -263.65
Table 3: Target’s Outcome Utilities
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LL
U (attack)+α
U (~resist)+α U (resist)+α
U (Cap) U (War)
1
2
U (~attack)+α
U (SQ)
U (Cap) U (War)
1
1 1
2 2
1 11 1 12
232 2 24
L
L
attack
~resist resist
Cap War
1
2
~attack
SQ
(A) 
(B) 
Figure 1: A Model of a Crisis Interaction between the Leaders of Two Countries
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